THE United States first placed an embargo on Cuba in 1960, one year after Fidel Castro seized power and one year before Barack Obama was born. It has since become part of the furniture of American foreign policy. Five decades of use will wear anything thin, and the logic behind the embargo looks ever weaker. It has failed to dislodge the Castro regime of either Fidel or, since 2006, his brother Raúl. Indeed, by enabling the island’s rulers to present themselves as the victims of hegemonic bullying, it has shored up support for Cuba abroad and given an excuse for totalitarianism at home. America’s allies think the embargo is counter-productive at best, vindictive at worst.
Why has America continued with it? Politics. For decades Cuban exiles in the swing state of Florida have supported it, and have made sure that the (mainly Republican) politicians who represent them enforce it strictly. And even if others in Congress privately think the embargo is loopy, few, especially on the right, want to look as if they are soft on the “communist”
Castros. Besides, they usually add, Fidel will die soon.
Whatever logic there was in this is being undermined in four ways. First, the Castros are becoming ever less communist. The process of economic liberalisation under Raúl took another step forward this week with the approval of a new law on foreign direct investment (see article). Like other moves towards capitalism, this one is halting: the state will still be an intrusive presence and firms will have little say over hiring and firing. But the law will slash tax rates for new investments and allow foreigners into new sectors of the economy. It confirms Cuba’s overall trajectory towards freer enterprise.
Cuba’s keenness on outside investment stems from the second reason to reconsider the embargo. The regime’s fortunes are tied to those of Venezuela, which supplies Cuba with cheap oil in return for doctors, intelligence support and a splash of ideological credibility. But Venezuela’s economy is crumbling and its leftist government is in trouble, so Cuba needs a plan B in case it demands market prices for its oil. The choice is probably between another helpful oil producer (Russia, whisper some) and greater trade with the outside world. Small cracks in the embargo allowed $360m of exports from the United States to Cuba in 2013; that figure would zoom if restrictions were lifted. Would Congress really prefer the Castros to choose someone like Vladimir Putin over free enterprise?
The third change is taking place inside Florida. Younger Cuban-Americans do not feel as bitter about Fidel as their grandparents do. Despite loosening restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba in his first term, Mr Obama picked up almost 50% of the Cuban-American vote in his 2012 re-election. In February Charlie Crist, a Republican-turned-Democratic candidate to become Florida’s governor, came out against the embargo, having previously supported it.
And, finally, there is business. Earlier this year Alfonso Fanjul, a sugar tycoon and longtime Castro opponent, raised the possibility of investing in the island. Heavier remittance flows mean that many Americans are now funding Cuban firms without having control over them. Meanwhile, other countries are pushing ahead. The European Union, the largest foreign investor in the island, is soon to start talks on a new accord. In January a deepwater port opened in Mariel on Cuba’s northern coast, a prime spot to handle traffic with the United States should the drawbridge come down. The port was built by Brazil; it is operated by a Singaporean firm.
Embargo, going, gone
There are still plenty of diehard anti-Castro figures in Washington. But calling the arguments they marshal threadbare is unkind to threads. Cuba does not threaten American security. It is playing a constructive role in the peace process between Colombia’s government and the FARC guerrillas. Its political system is nasty and undemocratic, but it is buttressed, not undermined, by the embargo. (The reverse is true of the standing of the United States in Latin America.) Waiting for the Castros to die makes no sense when Venezuela’s crisis presents an opportunity now to cement the process of liberalisation in Cuba.
If Congress will not budge, Mr Obama could use his executive authority to thaw relations further—loosening travel restrictions, taking Cuba off the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and trying to negotiate a swap of prisoners. But that is second best. The embargo increasingly exists only because it happens to be there.
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