I have been an enthusiastic and vocal supporter of Penney’s “no sale”
strategy for almost a year now, sticking with the brand even as its
marketing fell on deaf ears with consumers and investors. The stock was
up last month and its website was reportedly a favorite visit during the
holidays, but there’s every reason to expect it will report dismal
fourth quarter results (expertly obfuscated with stats on eyeballs,
awareness, and whatever). I now believe the company is doomed. We should
stop holding our collective breath waiting for success, and start
looking for lessons to learn from its failure.
In a sentence, Penney’s problem is that its strategy is
nothing more than pedestrian merchandising hidden behind glossy
advertising wrapped with some damn fine hype.
The pricing plan was never explained or substantiated. Nobody knows what the real
price of products should be at any store, not just Penney’s, which
means there’s always going to be a suspicion or expectation that they
can (or should) go lower. The “no sale” strategy was opaque on this
fundamental issue when it could have established a new approach to
support its prices with clearer explanations of costs, more transparency
on suppliers, even aggressive attacks on the competitions’ pricing. The
ads Penney ran on its pricing were idiotic to the point of being
irrelevant. So consumers missed sales because they were never given a reason to embrace the alternative.
It was simply a marketing ploy when it could have been a real
business change strategy. Imagine if Penney had established new rules
for its buyers that it could point to as proof of its claims. It could
have created new financing and lay-away policies that communicated
value, and used social media to create meaningful communities of
consumers who wanted to track and participate in conversations about
prices. Employees could have been recruited and trained to offer a
fundamentally new customer experience based on integrity — after all,
James Cash Penney started out at a store called “Golden Rule” before
buying and renaming the company — perhaps coming up with novel ways to
incentivize them.
Alas, no. None of it was promoted because none of it happened
or, worse, maybe it is underway, but the company’s brand experts feel
that such operational substance isn’t important. But news about
operations gets out anyway, so instead we’ve learned that suppliers are
questioning the company’s cash position and employees are leaving the
place in droves…while the brand squanders millions on marketing that
tells us nothing.
And all those grandiose promises about the merchandising! Ever tidbit
of bad news has been countered with claims that the company is
transforming its stores into aggregations of brand boutiques, centered
on bistros and offering other experiential stuff that would make them
destinations again.
The Apple
store was bandied about as a directional hint due the the CEO’s past
experience. I’m surprised analysts didn’t challenge this nonsense
sooner. Not only was it not proprietary or unique in any way, but it was
wholly disconnected from the blather about prices. What retailer doesn’t
sell branded merchandise? It ‘s an old, pedestrian idea made current by
nothing more than spin and the world’s willingness to withhold
judgment. I was hopeful, even though I knew that any brand that gets compared to Apple is probably doomed, or at least woefully misunderstood.
Well, it’s a new year, and I say the time for promises is over.
Somebody who understands retailing — and isn’t already bought and paid
for by a securities firm that makes markets for the sector, or a
‘research firm’ that relies on fees from the companies upon which it
issues reports — needs to ask J. C. Penney really blunt questions.
For the rest of us, I say we already know the answer, and it’s an important one for every brand: the days of marketing a ‘there’ without a there there are over. Smoke and mirrors aren’t worth it, whether or not they’re on sale.
www.forbes.com
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